The rules of the French navette system are quite complicated. Bills can be introduced in either house, the number of rounds is variable, and the final decision can be achieved in one of three ways: by voluntary agreement between the two houses, by adoption of a conference committee compromise (which must be approved by both chambers), or by a National Assembly vote of last resort. Because of the richness of institutionalized procedures, France can be singled out as one of the best cases for understanding the consequences of each particular rule of the navette system. The budgetary powers of both the National Assembly and the Senate are curtailed by the executive branch of government. The National Assembly has a mere forty days to review financial legislation; the government can then refer the budget to the Senate, which has an additional fifteen days to respond. In case of disagreement, procedures for normal legislation are followed with the proviso that Parliament has a maximum of seventy days from the initial deposit of the 4 During the period 1959-80 the Gaullist party dominated the National Assembly and Gaullist allies the Senate, so there is sufficient continuity for the usual statistical assumptions to be met. In the empirical literature on the Senate's legislative role, there are three distinctive explanations of senatorial influence, although, in many analyses, the three explanations are intertwined. The first attributes senatorial influence to the characteristics of the executive; the second argues that senatorial expertise and wisdom are critical; the third suggests that the degree of political congruence between the two houses is important. We examine and criticize each one in turn.
The process). In this article we focus mainly on the legislative game and only mention the intervention of other actors when appropriate."
In the empirical literature on the Senate's legislative role, there are three distinctive explanations of senatorial influence, although, in many analyses, the three explanations are intertwined. The first attributes senatorial influence to the characteristics of the executive; the second argues that senatorial expertise and wisdom are critical; the third suggests that the degree of political congruence between the two houses is important. We examine and criticize each one in turn.
The first type of analysis divides the legislative history of the French Fifth Republic into periods coinciding with the tenure of different presidents who, according to the constitution, are part of the government and preside over the meetings of the council of ministers. This periodization of French legislative history tends to emphasize the role of the executive intervention and attributes senatorial influence to specific presidential traits: de Gaulle was intransigent, while Pompidou was conciliatory; Giscard found support in the Senate, Mitterrand opposition. It focuses mainly on the game between legislative and executive, and not sufficiently on the game between the two houses.
The second type of explanation attributes senatorial influence to wisdom, moderation, independence, legislative expertise and constructive criticism.15 It tends to stress the number of disagreements between the National Assembly and the Senate (that is, the number of times Article 45.4 is applied) as the politically important dependent variable. There is, however, an interesting problem of internal coherence in explanations that begin with the claim that upper houses play an important role in decision making because their opinions are more considered and then study the disagreement of the two houses: if upper houses are so wise, why is it that they remain intransigent up to the last moment, instead of exercising the maximum amount of influence? Why do they not compromise?
Moreover, by treating parliamentary decision making as a dichotomous variable (either the two houses agree or the National Assembly prevails), the empirical literature is open to the following criticism. It is possible that some cases of disagreement would have been resolved if the navette was sufficiently 14 Our analysis ends with the 1986 National Assembly election when the Socialist majority was replaced by a conservative coalition of Gaullists and Giscardians. This period marks the so-called cohabitation of the socialist president with a prime minister and National Assembly of the Right. 15 This periodization of French legislative history tends to emphasize the role of the executive intervention and attributes senatorial influence to specific presidential traits: de Gaulle was intransigent, while Pompidou was conciliatory; Giscard found support in the Senate, Mitterrand opposition. It focuses mainly on the game between legislative and executive, and not sufficiently on the game between the two houses.
Moreover, by treating parliamentary decision making as a dichotomous variable (either the two houses agree or the National Assembly prevails), the empirical literature is open to the following criticism. It is possible that some cases of disagreement would have been resolved if the navette was sufficiently 14 Our analysis ends with the 1986 National Assembly election when the Socialist majority was replaced by a conservative coalition of Gaullists and Giscardians. This period marks the so-called cohabitation of the socialist president with a prime minister and National Assembly of the Right. 15 22 More precisely our representation is isomorphic, that is, there is a correspondence between the two models, so that one can solve any problem on one model and then transpose the solution to the equivalent solution of the other in a unique way. 23 There is, however, one major difference between the bargaining game of 'divide the dollar' and 'agree on a bill'. While both games assume the initial position of each player known, the 'divide the dollar' game is safe in assuming that each player's initial position is to want the whole dollar, while in our game there is room for strategic misrepresentation of (initial) preferences. For example, if the Senate wants a smaller (but positive) deficit than the National Assembly it could start the bargaining process by claiming that it wants no deficit at all. We shall discuss this problem in more detail in the incomplete information problem that follows.
Rubinstein produced one complete and one incomplete information model of bargaining. Following his steps, a series of formal models of bargaining with incomplete information have been developed. In our complete information model we will follow the Rubinstein model and calculate the effects of various procedures (selected by the government) on legislative outcomes; in our incomplete information account we adopt a similar model developed by Grossman and Perry,24 which is closer to the problem at hand than the original Rubinstein model. Impatience for agreement can be generated by a series of factors: by the sheer passage of time; by pressures of public opinion, which dislikes seeing its institutional representatives (the legislators) in disagreement. Legislatures are elected for the purpose of legislating and are often perceived by the public as inefficient when unable to produce legislation on a timely basis. The idea that time is an important aspect of the discount factor is also visible in those rules governing the legislative process that define the maximum delay of legislation by the upper house. There is, however, another more important reason for impatience: each round without an agreement pushes a bill one step further towards possible abortion, or may swing some votes in one or the other house, so that the compromise tomorrow may be worse (from the point of view of one house) than an agreement today.
Complete
In order to solve the bargaining problem, we start from the final position and work backwards. We assume that we have reached the third round, and that it is the Senate's turn to make a proposal. If the proposal is not accepted, in the next time period the government will ask the National Assembly to make the final decision. In this case, S knows that if its proposal is rejected by N, N will keep the whole ( Impatience for agreement can be generated by a series of factors: by the sheer passage of time; by pressures of public opinion, which dislikes seeing its institutional representatives (the legislators) in disagreement. Legislatures are elected for the purpose of legislating and are often perceived by the public as inefficient when unable to produce legislation on a timely basis. The idea that time is an important aspect of the discount factor is also visible in those rules governing the legislative process that define the maximum delay of legislation by the upper house. There is, however, another more important reason for impatience: each round without an agreement pushes a bill one step further towards possible abortion, or may swing some votes in one or the other house, so that the compromise tomorrow may be worse (from the point of view of one house) than an agreement today.
In order to solve the bargaining problem, we start from the final position and work backwards. We assume that we have reached the third round, and that it is the Senate's turn to make a proposal. If the proposal is not accepted, in the next time period the government will ask the National Assembly to make the final decision. In this case, S knows that if its proposal is rejected by N, N will keep the whole ( dN. Therefore, it will not accept any proposal that would offer less in this time period. So, S can keep (1 -dN) and leave dN for N. Similar reasoning can be applied for N in the previous period, and would lead to a different split of the dollar. The algorithm can be applied as many times as necessary until the final outcome is reached.
There are several general observations to be made. First, agreement is always reached in the first round; public disagreement is avoided. Since S knows that N finally prevails, it concedes what N would have obtained in any case and keeps the rest. The appendix provides the different splits of the dollar if the process lasts 1, 2, 3, ... or an infinite number of rounds. However, if one of the players is patient, if, for him, the passage of time or the existence of public disagreement is positive instead of negative, then disagreements will occur. One can extend the model for values of dN or ds greater than 1. The player with discount factor greater than 1 will always reject the opponent's offers, and will make unacceptable offers. Consequently, if the number of negotiating rounds is finite, the players will always exhaust the rounds until the final decision rules come into play; if the number of rounds is infinite, there will be no legislation. Discount factors greater than one and (consequently) strong public disagreements between the Senate (dominated by the political right) and the National Assembly (with a socialist majority) did occur during the Mitterrand presidency. We postpone our discussion of the empirical evidence until the next section.
The second general observation is that the more impatient a player is, the less his share of the dollar. Impatience is an indication of impotence: you are willing to give up much in order to reach an agreement sooner rather than later.
The third general observation is that it makes a difference whether there is an explicit stopping rule or the bargaining process continues forever. Comparing S's share under different numbers of negotiating rounds (see Appendix) leads to the following conclusion: PROPOSITION 1. When the National Assembly has the final word, the power of the Senate increases with the number of negotiating rounds.
Consider now the case where disagreements are resolved in a conference committee. This institutional structure cannot be explicitly studied by our model. However, we can assume that the outcome of this procedure is known. For example, suppose that the conference committee will split the difference 50-50 (since it is composed of seven members from each house) or any other default solution. If the default solution is different from the split without stopping rule, then the house that has the advantage in the default solution will lose power as the number of negotiating rounds increases. PROPOSITION 2. If the default solution is a conference committee, the most powerful house loses power as the number of negotiating rounds increases. dN. Therefore, it will not accept any proposal that would offer less in this time period. So, S can keep (1 -dN) and leave dN for N. Similar reasoning can be applied for N in the previous period, and would lead to a different split of the dollar. The algorithm can be applied as many times as necessary until the final outcome is reached.
Consider now the case where disagreements are resolved in a conference committee. This institutional structure cannot be explicitly studied by our model. However, we can assume that the outcome of this procedure is known. For example, suppose that the conference committee will split the difference 50-50 (since it is composed of seven members from each house) or any other default solution. If the default solution is different from the split without stopping rule, then the house that has the advantage in the default solution will lose power as the number of negotiating rounds increases. This model can be easily adapted to the political situation existing in the negotiations between two chambers, because, according to the rules of the navette, the two houses take turns making proposals to each other about the content of a bill, and whenever they agree on the content they stop the negotiation. One can consider the case where both players know the ideal point of the Senate but the National Assembly's ideal point is known only by the National Assembly itself, while the Senate has a probabilistic assessment: a 25 If the number of rounds is not an integer, that is, if one house introduces the bill and the other applies the stopping rule, the advantage depends on the time discount factors of both houses. 26 Grossman and Perry, 'Sequential Bargaining'.
The fourth general observation is that it does make a difference where a bill is first introduced. This model can be easily adapted to the political situation existing in the negotiations between two chambers, because, according to the rules of the navette, the two houses take turns making proposals to each other about the content of a bill, and whenever they agree on the content they stop the negotiation. One can consider the case where both players know the ideal point of the Senate but the National Assembly's ideal point is known only by the National Assembly itself, while the Senate has a probabilistic assessment: a The intuition underlying this representation is straightforward. The distance between ideal points reveals the degree of compromise required to strike a deal (controlling for the time discount factor). A National Assembly whose ideal point is far from the Senate's ideal point will be less willing to compromise than a National Assembly that is closer because, holding discount factors constant, it will have to move further to conclude negotiations successfully. In the empirical application of the two models (the complete and the incomplete information) we unify them conceptually the following way. In accordance with the complete information model we consider an 'impatient' National Assembly, a 'weak' one (with a low time discount factor); and a 'patient' Assembly, a 'strong' one (with a high time discount factor). In accordance with the incomplete information model, a National Assembly whose ideal point is distant from the Senate's ideal point is 'strong', while an Assembly whose ideal point is proximate is 'weak'. Consequently, the adjectives 'strong' and 'weak' refer to either the ideal positions or the time discount factors of the National Assembly. Uncertainty can exist regarding either the National Assembly's position or its time discount factor. In the empirical applications we consider time discount factors less than one as well as discount factors greater than one. In the latter case, one of the two houses (the Senate) is not impatient at all, that is, when it prefers the status quo over any compromise with the National Assembly (which covers the periods of divided parliament). In the empirical application of the two models (the complete and the incomplete information) we unify them conceptually the following way. In accordance with the complete information model we consider an 'impatient' National Assembly, a 'weak' one (with a low time discount factor); and a 'patient' Assembly, a 'strong' one (with a high time discount factor). In accordance with the incomplete information model, a National Assembly whose ideal point is distant from the Senate's ideal point is 'strong', while an Assembly whose ideal point is proximate is 'weak'. Consequently, the adjectives 'strong' and 'weak' refer to either the ideal positions or the time discount factors of the National Assembly. Uncertainty can exist regarding either the National Assembly's position or its time discount factor. In the empirical applications we consider time discount factors less than one as well as discount factors greater than one. In the latter case, one of the two houses (the Senate) is not impatient at all, that is, when it prefers the status quo over any compromise with the National Assembly (which covers the periods of divided parliament). Table 1 presents the number of laws enacted by the French Parliament each year between 1959 and 1980, divided into three categories: laws that were adopted in the first two rounds of the navette system; laws that were adopted after a meeting of a conference committee of the two houses; laws that were adopted by the National Assembly alone (Article 45.4 of the French Constitution).32 The table also presents the number of government bills introduced in the National Assembly first. Finally, the table presents data relevant to the composition of the National Assembly (Gaullist allies,33 Left, and total number of seats). . There were other centre-right parties that joined the Gaullist majority over time. The party names change while leadership and political platforms are more stable, so we refer to all the parties that joined the Gaullist majority as 'allies'. 34 Obviously, this is a simplification because discount factors are also bill specific. The same National Assembly facing the same Senate may be in a big hurry to adopt one bill and indifferent about another; or one particular project may be very important for the Senate while another may not be. However, considering discount factors as a function of the composition of the two houses will give us some information about the average interaction between the two houses in the course of the legislative period.
Conclusion 2 states that, under conditions of one-sided incomplete information, the number of negotiating rounds in bicameral legislatures

III. EMPIRICAL TESTS AND PREDICTIONS
We cannot test Conclusion 1 directly. This would require a random sample of legislation and an evaluation of each law and its proximity to the initial positions of the National Assembly and the Senate.31 We can test Conclusion 2 with aggregate data from the French legislature. While this provides no direct support for our conclusions regarding the institutional sources of senatorial strength, it does provide support for our conclusions regarding the length of the navette process and, therefore, indirect support for the model's other propositions. In this section, we outline our empirical referents for the concepts of 'discount factor' and 'uncertainty' and develop specific tests for the negotiating process. We then compare the results of our model with alternative explanations of bicameral negotiations and demonstrate the superiority of our model. Table 1 presents the number of laws enacted by the French Parliament each year between 1959 and 1980, divided into three categories: laws that were adopted in the first two rounds of the navette system; laws that were adopted after a meeting of a conference committee of the two houses; laws that were adopted by the National Assembly alone (Article 45.4 of the French Constitution).32 The table also presents the number of government bills introduced in the National Assembly first. Finally, the table presents data relevant to the composition of the National Assembly (Gaullist allies,33 Left, and total number of seats). . There were other centre-right parties that joined the Gaullist majority over time. The party names change while leadership and political platforms are more stable, so we refer to all the parties that joined the Gaullist majority as 'allies'. 34 Obviously, this is a simplification because discount factors are also bill specific. The same National Assembly facing the same Senate may be in a big hurry to adopt one bill and indifferent about another; or one particular project may be very important for the Senate while another may not be. However, considering discount factors as a function of the composition of the two houses will give us some information about the average interaction between the two houses in the course of the legislative period. Since the Senate has essentially constant composition over time, we can assume its discount factor is common knowledge. In contrast, we hypothesize that uncertainty about the National Assembly's discount factor varies according to its composition the following way: when the percentage of allies is high, the National Assembly will be known to be impatient (low discount factor). The idea is that the Gaullists will cater to their allies when they are an important part of the government majority. Conversely, when the majority in the National Assembly is known to be cohesive, that is, when the allies are weak, the Senate knows that any further delay will not produce significant results. So, high (low) percentages of allies in the National Assembly indicate that the National Assembly is impatient (patient), and that their level of patience (discount factor) is readily understood by the Senate. Intermediate levels of strength of the allies make the Senate unable to assess exactly the discount factor of the National Assembly. The Senate believes that the National Assembly's discount factor may be high or low, or anywhere in between.35
Conclusion 2 states that, under conditions of one-sided incomplete information, the number of negotiating rounds in bicameral legislatures
What effects does this analysis have on the length of the negotiating process? When the majority in the National Assembly is cohesive (weak allies), the Senate knows that the National Assembly is strong, consequently it will compromise in the negotiating process; when the majority is non-cohesive in the National Assembly (strong allies), the Senate knows that the National Assembly (Gaullists) is impatient to reach an agreement, and it will not settle without substantial concessions. In both cases, the navette should be short. In between, uncertainty about N's discount factor increases; according to Conclusion 2 the length of the negotiating process increases. Consequently, when the allies are strong or weak (ceteris paribus), there will be fewer iterations; when they are at some intermediate level of strength (to be specified empirically) uncertainty increases and the number of iterations increases. This Since the Senate has essentially constant composition over time, we can assume its discount factor is common knowledge. In contrast, we hypothesize that uncertainty about the National Assembly's discount factor varies according to its composition the following way: when the percentage of allies is high, the National Assembly will be known to be impatient (low discount factor). The idea is that the Gaullists will cater to their allies when they are an important part of the government majority. Conversely, when the majority in the National Assembly is known to be cohesive, that is, when the allies are weak, the Senate knows that any further delay will not produce significant results. So, high (low) percentages of allies in the National Assembly indicate that the National Assembly is impatient (patient), and that their level of patience (discount factor) is readily understood by the Senate. Intermediate levels of strength of the allies make the Senate unable to assess exactly the discount factor of the National Assembly. The Senate believes that the National Assembly's discount factor may be high or low, or anywhere in between.35
What effects does this analysis have on the length of the negotiating process? When the majority in the National Assembly is cohesive (weak allies), the Senate knows that the National Assembly is strong, consequently it will compromise in the negotiating process; when the majority is non-cohesive in the National Assembly (strong allies), the Senate knows that the National Assembly (Gaullists) is impatient to reach an agreement, and it will not settle without substantial concessions. In both cases, the navette should be short. In between, uncertainty about N's discount factor increases; according to Conclusion 2 the length of the negotiating process increases. Consequently, when the allies are strong or weak (ceteris paribus), there will be fewer iterations; when they are at some intermediate level of strength (to be specified empirically) uncertainty increases and the number of iterations increases. This interpretation leads to a quadratic specification of the actual number of negotiating rounds (low when the National Assembly is known to be strong or weak and high when the National Assembly is in-between). We will call this the quadratic composition model. In algebraic terms Pagree = C -c(allies) + d(allies)2 + e, In other words, the Senate and the National Assembly agree on the legislation after one or two rounds of the navette, making government intervention and further negotiations unnecessary. We resort to this indicator because the data on French legislation do not indicate the number of rounds of the navette. Rather they indicate whether agreement was reached fast (in one or two rounds); whether the legislation was referred to a joint committee (two or three rounds); and ultimately whether the joint committee failed to reach an agreement and the government asked the National Assembly to make the final decision. While these distinctions do not replicate the actual number of rounds in the navette, they are an indicator of the length of the process ranging from few to many rounds. See Table 1 for actual data. 37 The dependent variable in all the subsequent models is not dichotomous, but continuous (frequency of early agreement). The results reported subsequently are calculated by OLS. However, logit models produced similar findings. 38 The minimum of a quadratic function y = ax2 -bx + c is at the point x = b/2a. 39 Depending on the estimated model this percentage is 67 per cent (calculated from the estimated coefficients of Equation (3) interpretation leads to a quadratic specification of the actual number of negotiating rounds (low when the National Assembly is known to be strong or weak and high when the National Assembly is in-between). We will call this the quadratic composition model. In algebraic terms Pagree = C -c(allies) + d(allies)2 + e, 
where Left is the percentage of Left seats, and a and b are positive coefficients, and e is an error term. Estimation of Equations (1) and (2) produces the correct signs for a, b, c and d, but only Equation (1) produces statistically significant coefficients. The estimated coefficients can be used to calculate the strength of the Left and the allies that generates the maximum uncertainty about the National Assembly's discount factor.38 Such calculations indicate that the maximum uncertainty occurs when the allies control around 20 per cent of the seats, while the corresponding percentage for the Left has never been reached in the period we examine.39 On the basis of these observations we combine Equations ( 1 ) and (2) into the following equation which we refer to as quadratic composition with Left 36 In other words, the Senate and the National Assembly agree on the legislation after one or two rounds of the navette, making government intervention and further negotiations unnecessary. We resort to this indicator because the data on French legislation do not indicate the number of rounds of the navette. Rather they indicate whether agreement was reached fast (in one or two rounds); whether the legislation was referred to a joint committee (two or three rounds); and ultimately whether the joint committee failed to reach an agreement and the government asked the National Assembly to make the final decision. While these distinctions do not replicate the actual number of rounds in the navette, they are an indicator of the length of the process ranging from few to many rounds. See Table 1 for actual data. 37 The dependent variable in all the subsequent models is not dichotomous, but continuous (frequency of early agreement). The results reported subsequently are calculated by OLS. However, logit models produced similar findings. 38 The minimum of a quadratic function y = ax2 -bx + c is at the point x = b/2a. 39 Depending on the estimated model this percentage is 67 per cent (calculated from the estimated coefficients of Equation (3) 
where a, c and d are positive coefficients, and e is an error term. Equation (3) assumes that the discount factor of the National Assembly is uniform during each legislative period. This is a oversimplifying assumption. A more realistic approach would assume that the discount factor of the National Assembly may not come from the same distribution. It may change with the life-cycle of the National Assembly. A newly elected National Assembly is stronger (it is less impatient or has higher discount factor) than one that is about to be re-elected. If this is correct, conference committee referrals will be highest in the middle of the legislature's life. Consequently, the frequency of agreement will reach its minimum in the middle of the life of the legislature. Note that the argument is similar in nature to the quadratic composition hypothesis and is congruent with our bargaining model. We call this the cycling hypothesis.
In order to test this hypothesis, one additional variable is introduced: age of the legislature. This variable has the value 0 in an election year, and maximum value 4 (since elections occur normally every five years). The complete equation to be estimated is:
Pagree = C-a(Left) -c(allies) + d(allies)2 -f(year) + g(year)2 + e, (4)
where all variables are as in (3) and year is the age of the National Assembly, and f and g positive coefficients.
Before presenting the results of our estimations, we need to compare our hypotheses with those developed by other analysts of French bicameralism. The empirical literature distinguishes two dimensions of the National Assembly's political composition: the absolute size of the majority and the internal coherence of the majority. The first dimension refers to the strength or weakness of the opposition, which is indicated by Left strength in Table 1 ; the second refers to the relative strength of the government coalition partners, which is indicated by allied strength in Table 1 
where a and c are coefficients which are both positive or both negative (depending on the hypothesis), and C is the intercept. Table 2 46 Since the correlation between the age of the National Assembly and its composition is zero, the estimated coefficients of Equation (2) are unbiased even if one assumes that the fully specified model is Equation ( assume that under these conditions there will be no immediate agreement between the two chambers. Grange's rationale suggests a positive correlation between size and cohesion of majority in the National Assembly and speed of agreement.43 Consequently, the stronger the Left and the allies in the National Assembly, the more iterations will be needed to make a decision. In contrast, Georgel argues that when the National Assembly majority is large, ministers are no longer preoccupied with the opposition and refuse to negotiate.44 The working hypothesis here suggests a negative relationship between size and cohesion of the majority in the National Assembly and speed of agreement.45 In algebraic terms the linear composition model is the following: Pagree = C + a(Left) + c(allies) + e,
where a and c are coefficients which are both positive or both negative (depending on the hypothesis), and C is the intercept. Table 2 46 Since the correlation between the age of the National Assembly and its composition is zero, the estimated coefficients of Equation (2) are unbiased even if one assumes that the fully specified model is Equation ( Table 3 49 The March elections defused the leftist threat and positioned the allies more favourably within the conservative coalition. Giscard seized the opportunity created by friendly majorities in both houses to promote the programme described in his book Democracie Francaise.50 If one assumes that the discount factors of both houses increase when an important bill is introduced,51 that is, neither is willing to give in easily to the demands of the other, then Conjecture 2 indicates that the number of negotiation rounds will increase. We claim that the high number of politically significant bills is a plausible explanation for the high frequency of conference committee use in 1978.52 Table 3 If we are correct in our contention that the relative power of each house in bicameral legislatures is a function of institutional constraints (number of possible iterations, stopping rules, and where the legislative process is initiated), these institutional tools should be used as political weapons. In France it is the government which wields these political weapons. It decides where to introduce a particular bill, the number of rounds (two or three) the navette will last, as well as whether it will ask the National Assembly to make the final decision. John Huber has analysed the procedures used by governments on the floor of the National Assembly and found that such weapons are used by the French government in ways similar to those used by the legislative leadership in the United States.54 Our evidence is congruent with his arguments and pushes them one step further. The government uses its institutional weapons both to affect the results on the floor of the house and to affect the interactions between the two chambers.
Evidence indicates a positive correlation (0.34) between the bills the government introduces to the National Assembly and the bills where the government applies Article 45.4 (final decision to the National Assembly). Governments in the 1959-80 period appear consistent in their attitude towards the Senate. De Gaulle was against the Senate, Giscard promoted its role through these institutional tools. In this sense, as suggested by French legislative analysts, the government affects the power of the Senate; our model specifies the means through which the government is able to vary Senatorial power as well as the limits of this manipulation.
Further investigation leads to the conclusion that the stronger the Gaullist party, the more the government stacked the cards in favour of the National 
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parliaments refer bills to conference committees to increase legislative efficiency.
We have adopted a different approach. We explained the input of the Senate to legislation by the impatience of both chambers to reach agreement and the institutional constraints of the navette system. Our results are driven by the assumption that each house prefers an agreement today over the same agreement tomorrow and, therefore, is willing to make some concessions in order to reach this agreement. In this case, even if the National Assembly is constitutionally awarded the last word, it has to make concessions to the Senate in order to achieve its goal faster and without friction.
Our approach enables us to make predictions about the French parliament with more general comparative significance such as: -The power of one house increases when a bill is introduced in it. -The power of the weaker chamber increases with the number of rounds of the navette process. -Final veto power is an important indicator of the power of a house, but does not indicate complete control over outcomes.
Our results stress the political as opposed to the organizational consequences of different institutional arrangements or choices by governments or parliaments. In this sense, our model provides an alternative, institutional explanation to what we have called Cicero's puzzle: why the Senate is powerful even when the National Assembly has the final word.60
Our approach enabled us to focus on the bargaining game between the two chambers and to draw conclusions about the length of the legislative process. In our account of French legislative history, the independent variable is not the presidency of the Republic but the composition of the National Assembly. As a consequence, we are able to account for the whole period of interaction between the two houses with the same set of variables. Our expectations were corroborated by the existing empirical data on France.
The model and results presented in this article can be extended in several directions. First and foremost, there is an essential comparative dimension to our model. Most bicameral legislatures of the world use the navette system to reach agreement.61 Consequently, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 can be tested with empirical data from almost any bicameral legislature.
In the current form of the model the status quo is introduced indirectly: the more unsatisfactory the status quo, the more impatient the houses to agree on new legislation. However, the role of the status quo should be explicitly introduced into the model, and expectations concerning the power of each house as a function of the previous existing legislation should be developed and tested. In addition, in our model we ignored strategic actions of other players like the government or the conference committee. The government was assumed to parliaments refer bills to conference committees to increase legislative efficiency.
In the current form of the model the status quo is introduced indirectly: the more unsatisfactory the status quo, the more impatient the houses to agree on new legislation. However, the role of the status quo should be explicitly introduced into the model, and expectations concerning the power of each house as a function of the previous existing legislation should be developed and tested. In addition, in our model we ignored strategic actions of other players like the government or the conference committee. The government was assumed to 
